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INCEST-PROSECUTION
OF THE CASE
by Christine Lederer
While the physical abuse of children has been much
discussed, the sexual abuse of children, and incest in
particular, has, until recently, received very little attention. Broadly defined, incest refers to sexual activity between members of a family whose consanguinity would
ordinarily preclude marriage. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1141 (1964).
The incest taboo prohibiting sexual relations between
father and daughter, mother and son, brother and sister
has existed in virtually all civilized cultures since ancient
times. Yet, it has always been difficult to control the
problem of incest as only a small percentage of incestuous activity is ever reported.
The crime of incest did not exist at common law in the
United States. It evolved from religious or moral principles which societies determined to be sufficiently important to their preservation and to justify enactment of
laws prohibiting such activity. 5 N. Kentucky L. Rev.
191 (1978). Consequently, statutory prohibition of incest was created at varying times in different states.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §335 proscribes a person
from knowingly having carnal knowledge of another
person, who is within the degrees of consanguinity
within which marriages are prohibited by the law in
Maryland. The terms carnal knowledge and sexual intercourse are synonymous. CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW
OF CRIMES, 6th Ed. §11.01, 675. Sexual intercourse,
and thus carnal knowledge, as defined by the court in
Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1954),
means "actual contact of the sexual organs of a man
and woman and an actual penetration into the body of
the latter." The Court of Special Appeals in Scott v.
State, 2 Md. App. 709, 237 A.2d 61 (1968), has assumed that penetration is also an essential element of incest within the meaning of the term carnal knowledge in
article 27, §335. The court, however, specifically stated
that emission is not an essential element to establish the
crime of incest.
In order to prosecute the crime of incest, evidence
must be presented to establish the following facts:
1) The defendant knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse, and,
2) The sexual union occurred with a person being
within the degrees of consanguinity within which
marriages are prohibited in Maryland.
In order to establish the first element of incest, the defendant must be proven guilty of the lesser included of-

fense of carnal knowledge. Carnal knowledge by a
male, of 18 years of age or over, of any female, not his
wife, between the ages of 14 and 16 years is proscribed
by MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §464.
The second element requires evidence that the degree
of consanguinity between the parties is such that marriage would be prohibited by law. MD. CODE ANN. art
27, §370 proscribed marriage between persons within
three degrees of direct lineal consanguinity. In Lusby v.
State, 217 Md. 191, 197, 141 A.2d 893 (1957), it was
held that the prosecutix's testimony that the defendant
was her father was sufficient proof of her pedigraic
status. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, quoted
from 31 C.J.S. Evidence §266(b): "It has been held
proper, where the evidence is otherwise competent, for one to testify to facts of family history
which relate to him, such as identity of his parents,
or other relations... "
A common defense in sexual offense cases is that the
prosecutrix was an accomplice rather than a victim. The
Court in Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 199, 141 A.2d
893 (1957) distinguished the situations wherein a participant in an incestuous relationship would be deemed an
accomplice from those in which she would be considered a victim. The status of a participant is entirely a factual one. The key consideration being the free and willing consent to the sexual union by the woman makes
her an accomplice. The court held that a passive participant is a victim rather than an accomplice. A passive
participant in an incestuous relationship is defined as
one who does not fully consent to copulation so that
sexual union is achieved by force, threats or undue influence. In other words, the passive participant merely
assents, as opposed to consents, to the aggressive
participant's actions.
There is a material distinction between assent and actual consent, the latter meaning a voluntary agreement
to do something proposed by another and requiring
some positive action in addition to submission. Assent,
on the other hand, means mere passivity or submission
and does not include consent. Lee v. State, 18 Md.
App. 719, 308 A.2d 397 (1973).
Once the court determines that the prosecutrix is a
victim and not an accomplice, no corroborating evidence is required and the court is free to convict the accused on the victim's testimony alone. Lee v. State, supra, see Sutton v. State, 14 Md. App. 70, 72, A.2d
(1967). Tillery v. State, 3 Md. App. 142, 148, A.2d
(1967). In Robert v. State, 220 Md. 59, 151 A.2d 737
(1954), the Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix-victim, if believed, was sufficient
to sustain the conviction of the defendant on a charge of
having carnal knowledge of a female child under the age
of 14 years.

FORUM

U.S. v. Bear Runner, 574 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1978),
represents the first instance in which a federal court specifically rejects the corroboration requirement for an incest conviction in favor of the normal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. The defendant in this case was
convicted of incest under both federal and South Dakota law. The evidence against him rested primarily on
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, his twelve
year old daughter. On review, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that no corroboration of the complaining witness' testimony is required to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in incest
cases. In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit expressly rejected
the position of U.S. v. Ashe, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 356,
427 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1970), wherein the Court held
incest cases especially appropriate for the application of
the corroboration rule as distortions, misrepresentations,
and ordinary mistakes may occur more frequently
among people who are forced to live together and deal
with one another on a day-to-day basis.
Bear Runner follows the approach adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in U.S. v. Shipp, 409 F.2d 33 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969), in which the Court
upheld defendant's conviction for having carnal knowledge of his stepdaughter. The Court stated that:
"The triers of fact are to determine credibility, and
if they accept her testimony, the jury may convict
on it alone, if after considering any and all evidence to the contrary they believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
alleged crime . . . " Id. at 36.
Even though the Eighth Circuit cited Shipp as precedent for an incest case, the Shipp conviction was actually obtained on the ground that he had carnal knowledge of a female under 16 years of age. Therefore, the
Shipp ruling that corroboration of the victim's testimony
was not necessary for conviction did not apply specifically to incest cases until Bear Runner.
There has been little agreement as to what factors or
general characteristics contribute to the incidence of incestuous activity. However, regardless of what factors
are ultimately the cause of the incestuous act, there appears to be unanimous agreement that such occurrences
cause deep and long-lasting psychological scars and
have a very disruptive effect upon the familial structure
and its members.

THE "RIGHT" TO
ABORTION
by Nancy Kabara Dowling
Murphy's Law Book II defines a conclusion as "the
place where you got tired of thinking."' Apparently the
Supreme Court, Congress, and legislatures and courts
around the world have not yet tired of thinking about
the whole abortion issue: the West German Supreme
Court has concluded that a fetus is a "person" protected
by its Constitution. 2 Israel's Knesut has voted to restrict
its liberal abortion laws. 3 Australia's Senate is now considering an anti-abortion bill passed by its House. Abortion was legalized in Canada in 1969, but today is a
more divisive political issue than ever before. The
United States House of Representatives Joint Resolution
for a Constitutional Amendment that would extend protection to the unborn was sent to the Judiciary Committee in January. Commentators have described the Supreme Court's holding in Harris v. McRae 4 as going
in
5
precisely the opposite direction as Roe v. Wade.
Roe, the 1973 landmark decision that struck down local anti-abortion laws, provided no real conclusion to
the abortion controversy. Though hailed by many proabortionists as granting a right to abortion, what it did in
fact create was the theory that the state's legitimate interest in protecting "potential" human life was to be
weighed and balanced against the mother's6 right to "privacy" - at least during the first trimester.
Roe has been attacked - even by such eminent proabortionists as Professor John Hart Ely of the Harvard
Law School - on constitutional grounds. Ely described
Roe as a "frightening" precedent and states that "[t]he
problem with Roe is not so much that it bungles the
question it sets itself, but rather that it sets itself a question that the Constitution has not made the Court's busi7
ness. "
Ely notes problems with Constitutional interpretations:
"The Court does not seem entirely certain about which
provision protects the right to privacy and its included
right to abortion . . . 'This right of privacy, whether it be
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel
it is, or as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to terminate her pregnancy. Wade (93 S. Ct. at
727).' This inability to pigeonhole confidently the right involved is not important in and of itself. It might however,
have alerted the Court to what is an important question:
Whether the Constitution speaks to the matter at all. (emphasis added)""
The Court in Roe announces that the right to privacy
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy and then

